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JUDGES AS HUMANS: INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEMS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Chad M. Oldfather*

I.

INTRODUCTION

We demand a lot from judges. The job description calls for traits
such as impartiality, fairness, independence, integrity, civility, and
professionalism.1 What is more, the judge should exemplify these traits
not merely on good days, but every day in every case. The longstanding
conception of the judge in the American legal system calls for an
Olympian figure, who remains above the fray and whose primary mode
of action is detached reaction.2
That, of course, is an impossible ideal. Judges are people, and
people are fallible. Observers have undoubtedly always recognized this,
regardless of however strong the tendencies to believe otherwise.3
Lately, however, the recognition has become more systematic,
evidenced by a proliferation of empirical work by both legal scholars
and political scientists, as well as work drawing on the insights of
psychology to illuminate judicial behavior.4 The result is an increasingly
nuanced picture of judicial behavior, and the ways in which it departs
from our idealized conception.
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. A.B., Harvard College; J.D.,
University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jason Czarnezki for comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Preserving Judicial Independence—An Exegesis, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 835, 838-39 (2002); M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons:
Maintaining the Appearance of Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 47 (2005);
Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct’s Prohibition on Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 441, 446 (2006).
2. For one of the classic depictions of this conception of the judicial role, see Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.A.
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This Article begins the task of considering how we might put this
work to use to improve judicial institutions. Assuming the idealized
judge represents not merely a popular but also a normative ideal, we
must consider whether and how to modify the constraints on judicial
behavior so as to channel it more toward that end. My focus is on one
recent example of this scholarship—Lawrence Baum’s book Judges and
Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior.5 In the book,
Baum draws on social psychology in an effort to take account of the
effect of judges’ audiences—people whose regard is important to
them—on their behavior.
The result of Baum’s inquiry is certainly valuable in enhancing our
descriptive understanding of judicial behavior. He convincingly argues
that judges care about what their audiences think of their behavior, that
they do so largely for non-instrumental reasons, and that this can
meaningfully affect their behavior as judges. What is less clear are the
implications of this enhanced understanding for the design of judicial
institutions and practices. Some of the audiences—such as family and
social groups—are not the sort from which we could realistically isolate
judges, nor would that be desirable. A more general difficulty stems
from the problem of partial information—studies like Baum’s provide us
with a better understanding of the factors that affect judicial behavior,
but the picture remains far from complete. Reforms based on a partial
understanding of the forces at play might, by failing to account for less
salient aspects of judging, distort rather than reform. While it is tempting
to suggest that the appropriate response is to wait to implement change
until we can develop a more complete understanding of judicial
behavior, waiting is often not a realistic option. Just as courts must
decide cases based on the information that is available to them, so must
we, whether by action or inaction, make choices about the nature of
judicial institutions.6 This requires that we consider and implement
appropriate changes to the judiciary—such as changing selection
procedures or ethical rules, creating new courts, or otherwise changing
the processes of adjudication—without a certain sense of what the
effects of those changes will be. In doing so, however, we must remain
mindful of our limitations, making the avoidance of unintended negative
consequences as prominent a part of the analysis as achieving desired
ends.
5. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2006).
6. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3 (2006) (discussing what he calls “the institutionalist dilemma”).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses
our collective reluctance to regard judges as ordinary humans, and
outlines changes in the context in which judging takes place that suggest
the need for, at the least, greater receptivity to the notion that judges are
human. Part III discusses Baum’s book, outlining the dominant
academic conceptions of judicial behavior and Baum’s response to them,
as well as Baum’s application of psychological work on selfpresentation to judicial behavior, and situates it within the larger body of
legal scholarship drawing on psychology. Finally, Part IV takes up the
question of how best to use this sort of scholarship in changing judicial
institutions.
II.

THE MYTH OF THE NON-HUMAN JUDGE

However much we may understand, on an intellectual level, that
judges are mere humans, we have a tendency to believe that somehow
the process of becoming a judge effects a substantial transformation, and
that judges become different from the rest of us.7 At least implicitly, we
impute near-magical properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning
a black robe, as if they somehow eliminate one’s susceptibility to all the
foibles, biases, and petty jealousies that are the stuff of day-to-day life.
Jerome Frank called this “the myth about the non-human-ness of
judges.”8 This myth persists not only in the eyes of the public, but also to
a large degree in the estimation of practicing lawyers and legal
academics. Law school faculties are filled with those who purport to take
a cynical view regarding the purity of judicial motives. But an awful lot
of legal scholarship proceeds not only on the assumption that the judicial
role, properly conceived, involves a search for a more-or-less objectively
correct answer, but on the further assumption that judges might reach

7. Cf. Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the
Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 365 (2006) (noting “the perception of the
judicial office as one of impartiality and independence, which confers on judges a degree of moral
authority”). Another perspective on this is that we are engaged in a process of willful blindness.
“Judges have a special role to play in our democracy; they decide when others have messed up or
been messed with, and the other branches of government have stepped out of line. If we don’t want
judges popping up on Nightline to weigh in on the latest legal controversy, it’s because we don’t
want anything to disturb our image of them as black-robed and aloof. Keeping judges at a distance
from the rest of us makes it easier to hope that they’re also less fallible.” Emily Bazelon, Judges
Should Have the Right Not to Remain Silent, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 30.
8. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 147
(1949).
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that answer if only someone (typically, the author of the scholarship in
question) will point them the way.9
This is not to suggest that no transformation accompanies the
transition from lawyer to judge. Judges consistently report that their
lives changed in all sorts of ways when they assumed their new role.10
Their relationships with their former professional peers became more
distant and formal. They had to curtail their political activity. They
acquired a new first name. While perhaps disconcerting to the new
judge, all of this serves a purpose. It reinforces society’s high
expectations. Though she may never be able to achieve the ideal, we
expect the judge to make every effort to do so. But it is unrealistic to
suppose that any transformation is or could be as great as that for which
the idealized version of the judicial role would call. Judges are, after all,
human.11 And most are not merely humans, but also quite ordinary
9. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731
(1987).
10. See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE
STUDY GROUP ON PRE-JUDICIAL EDUCATION 15-16 (2005).
11. This is not an infrequently made observation. Indeed, a simple Westlaw search (“judge /3
human”) turns up all manner of interesting assertions regarding the implications of the humanity of
judges. These assertions generally take the form “because judges are human, they possess or lack
characteristic X.” Almost always the existence or non-existence of X is implicitly deemed selfevidently to flow from the fact that judges are human, and the point is developed no further.
Examples of the results turned up by such a search include the following: Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 98 (2005) (“Like all humans, judges have
inherently limited memories, computational skills, and other mental tools.”); Wendy Nicole Duong,
Law Is Law and Art Is Art and Shall the Two Ever Meet? Law and Literature: The Comparative
Creative Processes, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7 (2005) (“Judges (as human beings with passion,
emotions and prejudices, living in a multi-faceted society), also read and hear other things besides
legal precedents.”); Daniel A. Farber, Backward-Looking Laws and Equal Protection: The Case of
Black Reparations, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2271, 2298 (2006) (“Judges are human beings and
necessarily bring their own past experiences to bear when they consider legal issues.”); Chris
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance
Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 375 (2005) (“Judges,
too, are human beings, and like other human beings, judges surely employ heuristics in their own
decisionmaking.”); Amy Zimmerman Hodges, Identifying the Linguistic Boundaries of Sex: Court
Language Choice in Decisions Regarding the Availability of Sex and Procreation, 11 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 413, 415-16 (2005) (“Simply by being human, a judge, like any of us, uses basic
knowledge of language as a necessary, often subconscious tool in any writing.”); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 392 (2006)
(“[T]he judge, being human, is as subject as anyone to the environment and the news coverage that
shape public opinion in the first place . . . .”); Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery,
Jurisdiction As May Be Provided By Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36
N.M. L. REV. 215, 253 (2006) (“[J]udges, like other humans, surely are susceptible to the ‘hydraulic
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even
to accomplish desirable objectives.’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)); James
Michael Scheppele, Are We Turning Judges Into Politicians?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1517, 1524
(2005) (“Judges are only human, and do not want to lose their jobs or be sent to undesired
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humans.12 They are therefore susceptible to the same sorts of pressures
as the rest of us.13
This hardly constitutes a fresh insight. Indeed, the law recognizes
the reality of judicial humanity, requiring recusal in situations that
present temptations that are simply too great for judges to consistently
ignore. What is more, the law’s conception of those circumstances has
expanded over time. Early restrictions barring judges from sitting on
cases in which they have a financial interest have expanded to the
broader prohibition of “impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety,”14 and restraints against presiding over cases where “the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”15
While recognition of the basic idea of judicial humanity may not be
new, there is cause to believe that we are coming to an enhanced
understanding of what it means for judges to be human. Scholars are
studying judges and judging from an increasing array of perspectives.
assignments.”); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (1989) (“Judges are human and humans tend to abuse
power when they have it . . . .”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005)
(“Judges are indeed human; like jurors, they are often unable to ‘close the [v]alves of [their]
attention.’”) (quoting THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 143 (Thomas H. Johnson ed.,
1960) (1890)).
12. “Politics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play too large a role in the
appointment of federal judges to warrant treating the judiciary as a collection of sainted geniusheroes miraculously immune to the tug of self-interest.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
110 (1995).
13. Cardozo’s classic statement of the point is worth revisiting:
I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and
content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie
so near the surface, however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be
disclaimed. But the subject is not exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which
make the man, whether he be litigant or judge. . . . There has been a certain lack of
candor in much of the discussion of the theme, or rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss
it, as if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to
human limitations. I do not doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into
the realm of pure reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting
forces. None the less, if there is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process,
they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause
of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf
the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (1921).
14. ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 29 (2004) (quoting Canon 2: “A Judge
Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities.”).
15. Id. at 184 (quoting Canon 3E(1): “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”).
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Although social-scientific evaluation of judicial behavior dates back to
at least the 1930s,16 recent years have witnessed the application of a
growing array of methodological tools to the study of judicial behavior.17
Meanwhile, the contours of the judicial role have changed.
Whatever the normative desirability of a system in which the Olympian
judge largely reacts to what the parties have put before the court,18 such
a depiction is no longer descriptively accurate. Today’s judges preside
over caseloads many times the size of those of their counterparts a halfcentury ago, and involving a vastly larger range of issues and often
considerably more complicated factual inquiries.19 As a consequence,
the nature of the tasks judges must perform has likewise evolved. Trial
court judges rarely preside over trials,20 instead filling a more
“managerial” role and influencing cases from a relatively early stage.21
Appellate court judges no longer enjoy the ability to engage in unhurried
reflection over the cases before them, or even to write most of the
opinions issued under their names.22 They, too, have assumed a more
managerial role, presiding over a staff of law clerks who draft most
opinions and perform many of the other tasks traditionally within the
judicial role.
It seems reasonable to imagine that these sorts of changes in the
context in which judging takes place—and indeed in the nature of
judging itself—have affected judges’ perception of and performance in
their role. Indeed, some have suggested that what has resulted is
bureaucratized justice.23 One of the characteristics of this phenomenon is
that judges take a very different orientation to their work than did their
predecessors, potentially viewing it as a product of their chambers—“the
product of ‘many hands’”24—rather than as their own, personal product.

16. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 261, 269-75 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
17. See infra notes 29-43, 94-104 and accompanying text.
18. Indeed, Fuller’s work appears to be enjoying something of a renaissance as a basis for
suggestions regarding the appropriate content of the judicial role. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 34-37 (2003); Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 349 & n.138 (1997).
19. See Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 768-79 (2006).
20. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
21. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-78, 386 (1982).
22. Oldfather, supra note 19, at 768-71.
23. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442,
1444-49, 1452-59 (1983).
24. Id. at 1456 (internal citations omitted).
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This, in turn, results in a reduction in the judge’s sense of responsibility
for that product, and in a consequent reduction in its overall quality.25
These changes underscore the need to revisit the institutional
architecture of the judiciary. Whatever the appropriate balance of
independence and accountability, there is no reason to believe that the
mechanisms developed to achieve that balance in the past continue to
perform that task in an adequate fashion. We might likewise question
whether concepts like “impropriety” and “impartiality” adequately
capture the appropriate metrics by which to police judicial ethics.
Indeed, a number of commentators have recently considered the
effects of the systemic changes identified above (and more) on the
administration of justice, and to developing appropriate responses.26 This
work, like most legal scholarship more generally, has tended to rely on
casual empiricism in the form of “common-sense” conjecture about the
likely effects of a given rule on judicial behavior. Put another way, the
analysis tends toward the speculative, both in terms of describing how
the world presently operates and predicting how a proposed modification
would affect that operation. Such analysis has historically been
necessary in law simply because institutions must function and cases
must be decided, and in neither situation can the task await the
development of a comprehensive understanding of human behavior or
scientific causation or whatever might be necessary to a fully informed
decision. We do the best we can with the information available, and
hope that time reveals our decision to be correct.
The recent surge in interdisciplinary analysis of judicial behavior
holds out the promise—or perhaps the illusion—that this will change.
With a more nuanced appreciation of the forces at work in judicial
behavior, one imagines, we will be able to more carefully calibrate the
various constraints on judges to achieve our desired ends. But there is
reason for skepticism. The law does not, of course, have a perfect track
record in terms of incorporating scientific insights. A great deal of the
law of evidence, for example, is based on long-discredited assumptions
about human behavior.27 This is unfortunate. To the extent that the
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996);
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS (1994).
27. See, e.g., DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH
316-17 (2004) (exploring the questionable psychological underpinnings of evidentiary doctrine
relating to character evidence); see also John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1209 (2006) (discussing the untrustworthy generalizations that laws and rules of evidence
may be based on).
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sciences have developed an understanding germane to a particular topic,
we ought to draw on that understanding. The question is how best to do
so.
III.

JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES

A. The Incompleteness of Dominant Models of Judicial Behavior
Among the many recent efforts to begin the process of rounding out
our understanding of judicial behavior is Laurence Baum’s Judges and
Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior.28 Baum is a
political scientist, and part of his project is to demonstrate the
incompleteness of his discipline’s description of judicial behavior. He
opens by surveying the dominant conceptions of the judicial role as
viewed by political scientists. There are three: the legal, attitudinal, and
strategic models. The legal model views the judicial role as involving
primarily an effort to follow the requirements of legal doctrine and to
make good law in those cases where existing doctrine does not supply
the required answers.29 Under the strongest versions of this model,
judging entails complete indifference to the policy consequences of
decisions.30 Although this extreme version did not survive the legal
realist movement, many scholars (to a considerably larger extent in law
schools than on political science faculties) continue to view legal
doctrine as playing a meaningful, if not dispositive, role in judicial
decision making.31 Attitudinal models, in contrast, view judges as acting
purely on the basis of their policy preferences.32 “They cast votes and
write opinions that perfectly reflect their own views, regardless of what
their court colleagues and other policymakers might do in response.”33
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

BAUM, supra note 5.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7. For discussions of the attitudinal model, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 38-39 (2005); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002).
33. BAUM, supra note 5, at 7. The attitudinal model rests on a relatively narrow conception of
the factors that motivate judges. For example, at its most basic level, the attitudinal model holds that
“Rehnquist [voted the way he did] because he [was] extremely conservative; Marshal voted the way
he did because he [was] extremely liberal.” SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 32, at 65. One exception
involves “public choice” or “interest group” models of judging. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 12, at
109-44 (positing that judges might derive utility from various aspects of the position including not
only the salary and possibly enhanced leisure opportunities, but also popularity, prestige, reputation,
public interest, and the inherent joys of playing the “judicial game”). Another alternative uses legal
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Strategic models likewise view judges as acting to effect their policy
preferences, but in a considerably more nuanced and less reflexive
manner.34 They do not focus simply on the case at hand, but take a
longer view. Thus, for example, a strategic judge will be content to agree
to a result that she might not view as optimal in the present case in order
to secure the votes of her colleagues and thereby to avoid the greater evil
of the contrary result.35 What is more, she will take other considerations
into account, such as the need to seek reelection or even to satisfy the
public’s expectation that judicial decisions will be based on legal
considerations.36 Due in part to its relative comprehensiveness, “a
strategic conception of judicial behavior is now the closest thing to a
conventional wisdom about judicial behavior.”37
One of Baum’s central points is that these models share a
fundamental shortcoming arising out of one of their common
assumptions. That assumption is that judges “act solely on their interest
in the substance of legal policy, whether that interest is centered on
policy or on a combination of law and policy.”38 Judges under the legal
and attitudinal models bear a resemblance to Mr. Spock39 in that they
“act without emotion or self-interest in order to advance the general
good.”40 This tendency is even more pronounced in the strategic models.
Because of the large number of inputs judges acting under that model
take into account in making their strategic calculations—Baum invokes
Dworkin’s Hercules41 as an example of a fully strategic judge42—the
task of judging requires tremendous mental effort. “These judges court
interpretive approaches and institutional characteristics to model judicial decision making. See
Jason J. Czarnezki & William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of
Legal Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841 (2006).
34. The strategic “account rests on a few simple propositions: justices may be primarily
seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based only on
their own ideological attitudes. Rather, justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to
achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they
expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act.” LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998).
35. BAUM, supra note 5, at 6.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 9; see also SEGAL ET AL., supra note 32, at 34-35; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note
34, at 23.
39. Baum felt it necessary to further identify Mr. Spock in a footnote, which suggests that I
ought to as well. As Baum notes, Spock “was one of the leading characters in the Star Trek
television show and movies. Spock was half-Vulcan, and Vulcans were characterized by both their
altruism and their devotion to reason.” BAUM, supra note 5, at 18 n.16.
40. Id. at 18.
41. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-06 (1977).
42. BAUM, supra note 5, at 18 n.16.
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exhaustion with their arduous and often futile efforts to advance their
conceptions of good policy, efforts they expend only for the personal
satisfaction of trying to improve public policy . . . . [B]y standards of
ordinary behavior the fully strategic judge seems enormously
altruistic.”43
Baum concedes that there may be good reason to believe that
judges are concerned with making good law or good policy. But there is
not, he suggests, good reason to believe that this is their only concern, or
even their dominant concern. Judges lack a strong incentive to make
decisions on that basis, particularly given that they generally stand to
gain very little in the way of direct benefits from their rulings.44 At the
same time, other factors might sway a judge from the path of pursuing
legal or policy goals, such as a desire to get along with one’s colleagues
on a multimember court, to advance one’s career, or to lessen the
burdens posed by one’s workload.45
In light of this, Baum characterizes the strategic conception of
judicial behavior as requiring something quite extraordinary. He
demonstrates by contrasting the assumptions of a strategic model of
judging with those made by standard economic models of human
behavior. The latter assume that people are consistently rational and
motivated by self-interest, assumptions that have been called into
increasing question in recent years.46 Yet “[j]udges in the dominant
models of judicial behavior depart further from reality: they share
rationality and self-control with orthodox economic actors but act on the
basis of complete altruism rather than complete self-interest.”47
This conception is remarkable not only in its general denial of a
basic aspect of judicial humanity, but also in its implications. Among
other things, the single-minded focus on policy envisioned by the
dominant models suggests that judges care what others think of their
performance only to the extent that others’ impressions have
instrumental significance. Thus, if a given group’s opinions will have no
bearing on the success of the judge’s efforts to advance his conception of
appropriate policy, then that group’s esteem will have no effect on the
judge’s behavior. Whatever the merits of the dominant models—and

43. Id. at 18.
44. Id. at 10-11.
45. Id. at 11-14.
46. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055
(2000).
47. BAUM, supra note 5, at 21.
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Baum is clear about his belief that they have considerable merit—Baum
deems this to be too large an oversight of too fundamental a component
of human nature. Judges are humans, and a realistic conception of
judicial behavior must account for that basic humanity.
B. Judges and the Company They Keep
Baum’s central argument is that judges are concerned with others’
assessments of their performance, and that the bases of this concern are
not exclusively, and not even primarily, instrumental. He contends “that
judges care about the regard of salient audiences because they like that
regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Further, [he argues,]
judges’ interest in what their audiences think of them has fundamental
effects on their behavior as decision makers.”48 Baum does not propose
an alternative model of judicial behavior based on the relationship
between judges and their audiences, but rather suggests that such a
perspective is useful to enhance the descriptive power of the dominant
models.49
C. The Importance of Personal Audiences
Drawing on the work of social psychologists, Baum identifies three
simple premises:
1. People want to be liked and respected by others who are important
to them.
2. The desire to be liked and respected affects people’s behavior.
3. In these respects, judges are people.50

The mechanism through which the desire to be liked affects our
behavior is that of self-presentation—conscious and semiconscious
efforts to make a favorable impression on others. These efforts fall into
two broad categories: self-presentation motivated by instrumental
concerns (the desire to secure some concrete gain from an audience), and
that motivated by personal concerns (the desire to “seek popularity and
respect as ends in themselves, not as means to other ends”).51
Self-presentation motivated by instrumental concerns sounds an
awful lot like strategic judging, and it is not Baum’s focus. He instead
directs his attention to personally motivated self-presentation. In order to
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 23 n.19.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28-29.
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justify that focus, he must of course make the case that some significant
portion of judicial behavior is motivated by personal rather than
instrumental concerns.
Baum begins by identifying two primary instrumental purposes that
might motivate judicial self-presentation: career advancement, and the
furthering of legal or policy goals.52 Baum then argues that these types
of instrumental motivations cannot account for all of judges’ activities in
presenting themselves to their audiences. He bases this in part on the
claim that a judge’s incentives to make good law or effect good policy
simply are not that strong, such that there is plenty of room for other
motivations to affect behavior.53 He also provides examples, pointing to
Judges Samuel Kent and Alex Kozinski as among those whose written
opinions are inconsistent with what one would expect from judges
seeking elevation to a higher court—an ambition that Judge Kozinski at
least has quite openly held.54 Judge Kent’s opinions colorfully berating
lawyers have been widely circulated via the Internet,55 and Judge
Kozinski has a history of colorful language both in his opinions and in
his nonjudicial writings, as well as of such nonstereotypical behavior as
nominating himself as a “Superhottie[] of the Federal Judiciary.”56 Baum
likewise suggests that Justice Scalia provides an example of a jurist
whose judicial writings—particularly his “strongly worded dissents”—
are unlikely to serve him well in advancing his legal and policy goals.57
These examples may not make the point as forcefully as Baum
intends. At least for a time, Judge Kozinski’s quirkiness looked like it
might well land him on the Supreme Court. And it seems far from
certain that Justice Scalia’s irascibility has served him poorly. Indeed,
some argue that he has been remarkably effective in advancing his

52. Somewhat curiously, in light of the dominant models’ assumption that judges are
motivated solely by their legal and policy goals, Baum suggests that career advancement is probably
the strongest of these instrumental motivations. Id. at 39-40.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 40.
55. See Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 11, 11 (2001). Judge Kent has
recently made the news for even less savory behavior. See Lise Olsen & Harvey Rice, The Case of a
Federal Judge Who Went Much Too Far, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 11, 2007, at B1, available at
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2007_4458658.
56. BAUM, supra note 5, at 38 & n.10; Underneath Their Robes: Courthouse Forum: The Hot.
Alex Kozinski, http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/2004/06/courthouse_foru.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2007).
57. BAUM, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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agenda, especially given the frequency with which he is not in the
majority.58
More generally, there is a considerable distance between
“instrumental considerations are not everything” to “personal
explanations are the best explanation for judges’ off-bench selfpresentation.” Baum acknowledges that instrumental and personal
motivations often reinforce one another, and that their effects are
consequently often difficult to disentangle.59 Yet Baum does very little
to justify the dominant role he ascribes to personal motivations.60 As
noted above, Baum relies in part on his conclusion that legal and
political goals provide relatively weak incentives for judicial behavior as
compared to personal regard. Elsewhere he suggests that the immediacy
of the payoff to the judge may also play a role. While the ultimate
impact of a decision in terms of law or policy may be hard to measure
and may take a long time to manifest itself, the approval of a personal
audience is likely to be more tangible and immediate.61 But these
assertions are not presented together as part of a cohesive argument, and
instead must be cobbled together from various sections of the book.
Indeed, at times it is difficult to determine precisely what claim
Baum is making. While he generally suggests that personal audiences
are the most significant thing (“Those audiences whose esteem is
important to judges chiefly for personal reasons are typically more
salient and thus have greater potential impact on judicial behavior.”62),
his language occasionally evokes the more limited claim “that personal
audiences have a substantial impact on judges’ choices.”63
Still, Baum succeeds in making the fundamental point that judges’
personal self-presentation ought to be taken into account. That he is
comparatively less able to articulate the precise sorts of situations in
which personal and instrumental motivations might pull in different
directions is undoubtedly not the result of shortcomings in his efforts so
much as of the difficulties inherent in generalizing from conclusions
drawn from controlled experimentation to the considerably messier
58. See, e.g., Posting of Michael Dimino to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2006/09/happy_anniversa.html (Sept. 26, 2006, 12:57 EST) (“Though many disagree
with his methodology and conclusions, there can be no doubt that he has changed the way legal
arguments are made, and that the views he has championed carry much more weight now than they
did twenty years ago because of the voice he has given to them.”).
59. BAUM, supra note 5, at 29, 45-46.
60. See id. at 40-42.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 49.
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reality of the legal system. This is not to suggest that his conclusion is
necessarily wrong so much as it is to suggest that he has not fully made
the case that personal motives are at the heart of judicial behavior, or
provided a concrete framework based on which to assess the relative
importance of personal and instrumental motivations.
The analysis nonetheless produces some useful insights. For
example, even if one suggests that judges are likely to choose personal
audiences that reflect their pre-existing policy and legal positions, it does
not follow that personal audiences will have no effects. First, we do not
always have the luxury to choose our personal audiences.64 Our families,
social groups, and professional peers are often selected for reasons
independent of our free choice. Second, personal audiences can affect
behavior even where the judge and the audience share the same basic
points of view.65 If an instrumental audience also has personal
significance to a judge, the judge will not only be that much more likely
to reach decisions consistent with the audience’s preference in any given
case, but also to do so in a manner that is more aligned with the
audience’s preference in a qualitative sense. Put differently, a judge with
conservative personal audiences would thereby be more likely not only
to reach conservative decisions, but also to reach decisions that are more
conservative than they would otherwise be.
D. The Identity of Judges’ Personal Audiences
The bulk of Baum’s analysis considers the various audiences to
whom judges might engage in self-presentation.66 He contends that
judges social groups and professional peers are the audiences that have
the greatest influence on their behavior. The dominant models assume
that the influence of social groups on judges’ behavior has run its course
by the time they reach the bench, and that in any case judges have no
great incentive to please their social groups for their own sake simply
because those groups have no ability to frustrate the judges’ legal or
policy goals.67 These assumptions do not hold, Baum asserts, if judges
are like the rest of us. “Because social groups are so integral to people’s

64. Id. at 46.
65. Id. at 46-47.
66. Chapter three focuses on the audiences that have already received consideration in prior
scholarship on judicial behavior, including judges’ judicial colleagues, the public, and the other
branches of government. In general, Baum concludes that the influence of these audiences is not
significant. Id. at 86-87.
67. Id. at 89.
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sense of themselves, people have strong incentives to please members of
these groups and to avoid alienating them.”68
The nature of the resulting influences is unclear:
As an audience, social groups can affect judges in multiple ways.
To take one example, judges may want their families and friends to
perceive them as people who embody virtues such as impartiality that
they associate with good judges. This goal could move judges to act in
ways that emphasize their fealty to the law as a basis for judgment.
Alternatively, judges may want to be seen as acting consistently with
the policy views that predominate in their social circles. This second
type of impact is not necessarily the more powerful, but its potential
effects are easier to trace.69

Baum uses the federal courts’ response (often better characterized
as a lack of response) to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education as one illustration of the powerful effect that
personal audiences can have on the judiciary,70 and judicial
responsiveness to women’s rights issues as another.71
An orientation toward the legal community as a personal audience
might pull in a slightly different direction. Because lawyers are
socialized to value the role of law as the appropriate source of legal
decisions, “judges who want the respect of practicing lawyers, legal
academics, and other judges have an incentive to be perceived as
committed to the law and skilled in its interpretation.”72 As a result, here
is another way in which judicial backgrounds might matter. Judges who
spent most of their pre-judicial careers in the practice of law should be
more responsive to the legal community as an audience. Those coming
from a largely political career, in contrast, could be expected to be
relatively indifferent to the bar.73
Baum also examines the possibility that policy groups and news
media might also function as personal audiences for judges. Policy
groups can of course play a significant role as instrumental audiences,
both in terms of career advancement as well as through the work of
advocating on behalf of a judge’s preferred policies. But there can be a
substantial personal aspect as well. “If people who share a point of view
about legal policy function as a reference group for a judge, the judge
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90-94.
Id. at 94-97.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 114.
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has an incentive to take actions that those people approve. That is
especially true when their approval would counterbalance criticism from
other sources.”74 What results is not fundamental change—a policy
group is unlikely to serve as a personal audience for a judge that does
not already share its basic conception of good policy—but rather the
reinforcement of the judge’s preexisting viewpoint, and of greater
consistency in its application.75 Because the judge values, for its own
sake, the esteem in which she is held by a policy group, she has an
incentive to reach decisions that will maintain that esteem, even if those
decisions are different from the decisions she would have made in the
absence of the policy group.
The possibility that interest in obtaining favorable news coverage
might motivate judicial decisions has received attention lately. Thomas
Sowell called this “the Greenhouse effect” after The New York Times
reporter Linda Greenhouse. Sowell believed that Greenhouse’s flattery
of Justice Blackmun provided an important impetus for the Justice’s
decisions.76 Baum posits that the news media might serve as an
important personal audience in two respects. First, for the simple reason
that favorable coverage may represent an end in itself.77 Second, the
media are a mechanism through which judges can reach their other
audiences.78 Because of this, he finds a Greenhouse effect plausible.
“The claim of a Greenhouse effect is especially intriguing because it can
encompass all four categories of personal audiences discussed in this
chapter and the preceding one: social groups, the legal profession, the
mass media, and—less directly—policy groups.”79
Indeed, he presents empirical support for the claim, in the form of
an analysis of changes in the voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices
in civil liberties cases from their first two years on the Court to later
periods in their tenure. He found that among the nine Republican
Justices who did not reside in Washington before their elevation to the
Court—who had not, one might surmise, inoculated themselves against
the Greenhouse effect:
[T]here were clear and substantial increases in liberalism for four and
more limited or ambiguous increases for three others. In contrast, only
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 121.
76. Baum cites Thomas Sowell, Blackmun Plays to the Crowd, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Mar. 4, 1994, at 7B, as the first use of the phrase. BAUM, supra note 5, at 139.
77. BAUM, supra note 5, at 136.
78. Id. at 135-36.
79. Id. at 142.
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one of the nine justices in the other groups [which included Democrats
and Republicans who resided in Washington before joining the Court]
had more than minimal increases in liberalism.80

Significantly, Baum does not present this as conclusive proof of the
existence of a Greenhouse effect. Other interpretations of the data are
possible, such as that the changes were motivated by strategic concerns,
or by basic changes in the Justices’ policy positions as a result of the
force of contrary argument.81 Moreover, his results “suggest that
residency had a greater impact on voting change than initial ideological
positions.”82 Nonetheless, the possibility of a Greenhouse effect is
plausible under an audience-based conception of judging, and Supreme
Court Justices, because of their autonomy and insulation from political
or career-based pressures, might be uniquely susceptible to it.83
E. The Implications of Baum’s Analysis
The conclusions that Baum draws from his analysis are, as they
necessarily must be, tentative. His emphasis remains on the central point
that taking judicial audiences into account reveals shortcomings in the
perspective of the dominant models. Still, Baum suggests some ways in
which an audience-based perspective will provide insights not otherwise
accounted for in the dominant models. Among other things, he suggests
quite plausibly that judges’ personal audiences are likely to consist
largely of elites.84 Thus, he suggests, Justice Scalia’s assertion in
Lawrence v. Texas, that the majority of his colleagues on the Supreme
Court acted in large part due to their having been influenced by elite
legal culture, may have some truth to it.85 This is not an effect that is
necessarily consistent, either in terms of its effect across the range of
judges (who will differ in the nature of the elites that form their social
groups and personal audiences) or in terms of its political valence (elites
might tend to be more socially than economically liberal). But the point
remains that “[g]roups that do not serve as personal audiences for judges
are at a relative disadvantage in shaping judges’ choices unless they
connect well with judges’ instrumental incentives.”86 General public

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 90, 163.
Id. at 163.
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opinion, in other words, will likely have a weaker effect on judicial
behavior than the opinion of judges’ personal audiences.87
All of this suggests a related point of difference. If judges are
affected by their personal audiences, and if their personal audiences
differ, then a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing the determinants of
judicial behavior will miss much of what actually drives that behavior.88
Thus we might profit from studying judicial behavior in light of the
number and type of appearances that judges make before policy
groups.89 In similar fashion, because judges’ career paths are likely to be
suggestive of some of the audiences to which they orient themselves,
increasing study of judicial backgrounds might prove useful.90 And
because “the sets of audiences that are most salient to judges may vary
systematically across courts”91 an increased focused on the differences
between judges at varying levels of the judicial hierarchy could likewise
prove beneficial.92 Since lower-court judges are more likely to have
personal ties with their local counterparts in other branches of
government, for example, we might expect to see such judges place
greater weight on those sets of interests.93
IV.

A CALL FOR METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM
AND THEORETICAL AGNOSTICISM

Judges and Their Audiences is not the sort of book that breaks new
ground by uncovering previously hidden aspects of judicial behavior.
Nor does it purport to do so. Consequently, along that dimension there is
little, if anything, new here. For example, the notion that the interaction
between judges and their colleagues (that is, one of their personal
audiences) will tend to reinforce and strengthen preexisting decisional
tendencies lies at the heart of Cass Sunstein’s recent exploration of
“ideological amplification,”94 and has a relatively lengthy pedigree.95

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170-71.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 8-16 (2006) (exploring the effects of “ideological amplification” and
“ideological dampening”).
95. Sunstein and his colleagues cite to ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1986).
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 94, at 154 n.8. Steven Pinker has traced the underlying

OLDFATHER.FINAL

2007]

1/14/2008 11:54:41 AM

JUDGES AS HUMANS

143

Nor is Baum the first to apply insights from psychology to judicial
decision making. “Behavioral law and economics” draws heavily on
cognitive psychology to portray human decision making as boundedly
rational and as incorporating all manner of biases and heuristics that lead
to regular departures from rationality.96 This has led to a tremendous
amount of interesting legal scholarship, some of which has focused
specifically on the judging process.97 There are other examples.
Lawrence Wrightsman has devoted an entire volume to various
applications of psychology to judicial decision making.98 Dan Simon has
developed a psychological model of judicial decision making.99 And
these are only a few.
The portrait that emerges from this growing body of work is messy
and complex. Judges are susceptible to all sorts of influences and
psychological processes as they make decisions, only some of which are
consistent with the dispassionate, rational, Olympian figure at the heart
of our conception of judging. In this respect judges are—like the rest of
us—human.
A substantial part of Baum’s contribution here is that he
underscores this point. Political scientists have developed a conception
of judicial behavior that, in placing a desire to achieve policy goals as its
centerpiece, departs from reality. Legal academics, though perhaps
adhering less consistently to a single, coherent model of how judges act,
likewise tend to assume that judges are driven largely by legal doctrine.
Both camps have remained largely oblivious not only to one another, but
psychological research back to the 1950s. See Posting of Steven Pinker to The New Republic: Open
University, http://www.tnr.com/blog/openuniversity?pid=35618 (Sept. 4, 2006, 14:03 EST).
96. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998) (arguing that “behavior is systematic and can be modeled” and
providing numerous examples of such models); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 46, at 1058 (arguing
that this new approach allows scholars “to understand the incentive effects of law better than
modern law and economics is able to do by enlisting more sophisticated understandings of both the
ends of those governed by law and the means by which they attempt to achieve their ends”).
97. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001); Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 599 (2003); Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Russell Korobkin, The
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
98. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT?
(1999). Wrightsman covers some of the same ground as Baum, but does so within the framework of
the attitudinal model. He assumes that policy goals drive decision making, and explores how the
concept of “motivated reasoning” might enable judges with differing policy goals to come to
divergent assessments of the same case. Id. at 55-56.
99. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1
(1998).
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to the rest of social science (with economics being a notable exception in
the case of legal scholars).100 This is changing. The legal academy has,
for example, become increasingly receptive to the sorts of quantitative
empirical analysis practiced by political scientists. At least as between
law and political science, then, “interdisciplinary ignorance” seems to be
in moderate decline.101 Psychology is a relative latecomer, but one with
significant insights that have themselves found increasing play in the
depiction of judicial behavior.
The complex, human judge presents a difficult creature for the legal
system.102 We cannot count on him to reliably follow the law, or even to
reliably decide cases consistent with some relatively constant,
underlying conception of good policy. Indeed, given the number of cases
on his docket and the amount and nature of assistance provided by his
law clerks, it may not even be that we can meaningfully count on him to
“decide” some of the cases before him at all.103 Not surprisingly, any
effort to take all of this complexity into account would make for difficult
prediction, which is why academic models tend toward simplification.104
The fewer the variables under consideration, the easier it tends to be to
account for the impact of those variables.
But what makes for bad, or at least cumbersome and inelegant,
social science may be necessary in the context of legal reform. Efforts to
refine the institutional context in which judging takes place—that is, to
structure the judicial role in such a way as to channel actual judicial
behavior closer to ideal judicial behavior—are likely to benefit from
more developed knowledge of judicial psychology. Institutional reform
based on the sort of necessarily incomplete picture of judicial behavior
imagined by the predominant models may be undesirable simply
because it fails to account for all of what is driving the phenomena
sought to be addressed. Under the legal model, for example, the response
to a series of bad decisions is to call for better law. But if the law is
insufficiently determinate to compel the “right” results in every case,
100. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great
Divide (Between Law and Political Science), 3 GREEN BAG 2D 267 (2000).
101. See Posting of William Ford to Empirical Legal Studies: Blog Forum—Interdisciplinary
Ignorance and the Great Divide, http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/10/
blog_forum_inte.html (Oct. 1, 2006, 23:10 EST).
102. For a discussion of this phenomenon with specific reference to behavioral law and
economics, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 748-52 (2000).
103. See Oldfather, supra note 19, at 770-71.
104. “In theory-making, descriptive accuracy is purchased at a sacrifice of predictive power.”
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 263 (2001).
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and cannot realistically be made specific enough to compel those results
in all or most of the cases that might arise, then such a remedy will be
incomplete. Alternatively, such regulation may have unintended
consequences. If we accept the attitudinal model’s assumption that
ideology is the driving force behind judicial behavior, then we might
consider altering judicial selection procedures to exclude or discourage
those with a strong history of political activity from becoming judges.
But in so doing, we might inadvertently lower the quality of judging if
political activity turns out to be positively correlated with some trait that
we accept as desirable in judges, such as life experience or raw
intelligence.105
Only by first locating the potential weak points in the judicial
psyche can we hope to create institutions and develop mechanisms that
serve as prophylactics against any resulting undesired consequences.
Baum’s analysis provides some examples. If mere contact with personal
audiences tends to skew judicial behavior in what we conclude are
undesirable ways, then we might want to rethink the way we go about
regulating those relationships. And if some of the influences seem to be
beyond direct regulation, then we should consider mechanisms for
indirect regulation. We might, for example, be willing to entertain the
possibility of enhanced restrictions on, or greater disclosure and
monitoring of, interactions between judges and policy or legal groups.
We are considerably less likely to regulate the relationships between
judges and their families or social groups. If we conclude that the latter
sorts of interactions are likely to have pernicious effects, we will need to
explore alternative means of attempting to channel judicial behavior in
more appropriate directions, such as efforts to make the process of
judging more transparent in general.106
Of course, a commitment to taking psychology into account
presents its own, parallel set of dangers. An incomplete or inaccurate
psychological account can just as easily produce prescriptions that
misdirect behavior as an erroneous account generated on any other basis.
It may well be that the process of becoming a judge actually does
insulate judges from some of the psychological shortcomings that afflict

105. This dynamic is hardly unique to this context. For example, the risk of such unintended
consequences is one of the drawbacks of informational regulation. Oldfather, supra note 19, at 78587.
106. I have advanced one such proposal elsewhere. Id. at 795-801.
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most humans.107 There are other reasons to suspect that the insights of
psychology ought not to be too aggressively applied to judging. Greg
Mitchell has made such a point in arguing that much of the early work in
behavioral law and economics is insufficiently grounded in, or too
aggressively extends, the psychological research on which it is based.108
What is more, psychology may ultimately tell us that people possess
certain traits only intermittently, depending on context, mood, and so
forth.109 Thus a focus on the apparent revelations of psychology might
lead to an overemphasis on the identified features of behavior to the
exclusion of unstudied, and thereby unappreciated but potentially
powerful, behaviors.
These points are well taken. Still, the response cannot be simply to
declare the questions too difficult to address. A complete understanding
of human—and thus judicial—behavior remains far off, if it is attainable
at all. In the meantime, we must choose whether to continue with the
present design of our judicial system or make any of a number of
potential modifications to it.110 These choices must be informed, and
undertaken with appropriate caution. Thus we should pursue the task by
way of methodological pluralism, pursuant to which a given problem
should be studied using as many methods as available.111 At least as a
default position, reforms ought to be fashioned in such a way as to “do
no harm”—that is, be designed to minimize their unintended
consequences.112 This is not to advocate a general aversion to change.
The status quo may be, and in many corners of the judiciary undoubtedly
is, so unacceptable as to warrant some amount of risk that a reform will
not have its intended or anticipated effects. And bold reform might serve
goals beyond its instrumental effects, such as by enhancing perceptions
of judicial legitimacy. None of these things are inconsistent with the sort
of prudence involved in adopting a broad perspective.
This approach should be coupled with what we might call
“theoretical agnosticism.” From a normative perspective, the proper

107. See generally Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds.)
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015143.
108. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002).
109. Id. at 87-119.
110. For an overview of the sorts of modifications that have been proposed or actually made, in
the context of appellate courts, see DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES,
FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 421-570, 951-1057 (2006).
111. Mitchell, supra note 108, at 127-32.
112. Id. at 132.
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nature of the judicial role is both contestable and contested.113 Those
charged with the task of institutional design and modification must
accordingly avoid becoming wedded to any particular account of judicial
motivations or capacities. They must instead draw on all of what is
available, and remain mindful of the likelihood that no single theory or
method will capture all of the factors at play. In this respect it is the
institutional architects, rather than the judges, who must strive for
something approaching omniscience.
V.

CONCLUSION

The belief that those charged with designing the institutions and
procedures in which judges work can take appropriate account of all
relevant inputs may be only slightly more realistic than the belief that the
strategic judge can do so. Still, the appropriate response is not to wait for
the day we develop a comprehensive understanding of human, and thus
judicial, behavior. That day may never come. And even if it does, we
cannot afford to wait. Judges do not have the luxury of deferring rulings
on complex, contested questions that arise in litigation until the
underlying science is settled. Neither should we defer questions of how
best to design institutions to shape judicial behavior until we have a
complete sense of how specific modifications might interact with human
psychology. We should instead act with a full understanding that our
knowledge is provisional and subject to revision, and that mistakes will
accordingly be made. Such is the way of human institutions.

113. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication
and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121 (2005) (discussing judicial inaction and providing a
framework and various criteria for assessing and debating the adjudicative process).

